Introduction
One reason for the study of programs in the presence of faults, i.e. defects at the lowest level of abstractions [2] , is to be able to construct more dependable systems, meaning systems exhibiting a high probability of behaving according to their specification [18] . System dependability is often expressed through attributes like maintainability, availability, safety and reliability, the latter of which is defined as a measure of the continuous delivery of correct behaviour, [18] . There are a number of approaches for achieving system dependability in the presence of faults, ranging from fault removal, fault prevention and fault tolerance.
The fault tolerant approach to system dependability consist of various techniques that employ redundancy to prevent faults from generating failure, i.e. abnormal behaviour caused by faults [2] . Two forms of redundancy are space redundancy (replication), i.e. using several copies of the same system components, and time redundancy, i.e. performing the same chunk of computation more than once. Redundancy can also be managed in various ways: certain fault tolerant techniques are based on fault detection which subsequently trigger fault recovery; other techniques do not use fault detection and still attain fault masking -these, however, tend to be more expensive in terms of redundancy usage (time redundancy). If enough redundancy is used and it is managed appropriately, this can lead to fault masking, where the specified behaviour is preserved without noticeable glitches.
Fault tolerance is of particular relevance in distributed computing. Distribution yields a natural notion of partial failure, whereby faults affect a subset of the computation. Partial failure, in turn, gives scope for introducing redundancy as replication, distributed across independently failing entities such as locations. In general, the higher the replication, the greater the potential for fault tolerance. Nevertheless, fault tolerance also depends on how replicas are managed. One classification, due to [18] , identifies three classes, namely active replication (all replicas are invoked for every operation), passive replication (operations are invoked on primary replicas and secondary replicas are updated in batches at checkpoints), and lazy replication (a hybrid of the previous two approaches, exploiting the separation between write and read operations).
In this paper we address fault tolerance in a distributed setting, focusing on simple examples using stateless (read-only) replicas which are invoked only once. This simplification obviates the need for additional machinery to sequence multiple requests (in the case of active replication) or synchronise the state of replicas (in the case of passive replication); as a result management techniques based on lazy replication simply collapse into passive replication category. Nevertheless, these simple examples still capture the essence of the concepts we choose to study.We code these examples in a simplified version of Dπ [10] with failing locations [4] , a distributed version of the standard π-calculus [16] , where the locations that host processes model closely physical network nodes. 1 , k 2 and k 3 . A database looks up the mapping of the value x using some unspecified function f (−) and returns the answer, f (x), back on port y. When multiple (database) replicas are used, as in server 2 and server 3 , requests are sent to all replicas in an arbitrary fashion, without the use of failure detection, and multiple answers are synchronised at l on the scoped channel sync, returning the first answer received on y. [[req?(x, y) .go k 1 The theory developed in [4] enables us to differentiate between these systems, based on the different behaviour observed when composed with systems such as
Example 1 (Fault Tolerant Servers) Consider the systems server i , three server implementations accepting client requests on channel req with two arguments, x being the value to process and y being the reply channel on which the answer is returned. Requests are forwarded to internal databases, denoted by the scoped channel data, distributed and replicated across the auxiliary locations k
in a setting where locations may fail; in the definition of client, ret is the name of a reply channel, and v is some value appropriate to the unspecified function f (−).
Here we go one step further, allowing us to quantify, in some sense, the difference between these systems. Intuitively, if locations k 1 , k 2 and k 3 can fail in fail-stop fashion [17] and observations are limited to location l only, then server 2 seems to be more fault tolerant than server 1 . In fact observers limited to l, such as client, cannot observe changes in behaviour in server 2 when at most 1 location from k 1 , k 2 and k 3 fails. Similarly, server 3 is more fault tolerant than server 1 and server 2 because the composite system server 3 | client preserves its behaviour at l up to 2 faults occurring at any of k 1 , k 2 and k 3 .
In this paper we give a formal definition of when a system is deemed to be fault tolerant up to n-faults, which coincides with this intuition. As in [4] we need to consider systems M, running on a network, which we will represent as Γ ⊲ M, where Γ is some representation of the current state of the network. Then we will say that M is fault-tolerant up to n faults, when running on network Γ, if
where F n [ ] is some context which induces at most n faults on Γ, and is some behavioural equivalence between system descriptions.
A key aspect of this behavioural equivalence is the implicit separation between reliable locations, which are assumed not to fail, and unreliable locations, which may fail. In the above example, l is reliable while k 1 , k 2 and k 3 are assumed unreliable, thus subject to failure. Furthermore, it is essential that observers not have access to these unreliable locations, at any time during a computation. The general intuition is that we shield users from unreliable resources, thereby ensuring that no user code fails. But another important reason, which is more specific to this work, is that if observers are allowed to access unreliable locations then the proposed (1) above would no longer capture the intuitive notion of fault-tolerance up to n faults. For instance, we would no longer have
An observer with access to any of the locations k 1 , k 2 , k 3 would be able to detect possible failures in
, not present in Γ ⊲ server 2 , and thus discriminate between the two configurations.
We enforce this separation between reliable, observable locations and unreliable, unobservable locations using a simple type system in which reliable locations are represented as public values, and unreliable locations are represented as confined. In particular the typing system ensures that confined values, that is the unreliable locations, never become available at public locations.
In the second part of the paper we develop co-inductive proof techniques for proving system fault tolerance, that is establishing identities of the form (1) above; this can be seen as a continuation of the work in [4] . One novel aspect of the current paper is the use of extended configurations which have the form
Here, the network Γ is bounded by the number n, denoting the maximum number of faults that Γ can still incur at unreliable locations. This extra network information allows us to define transitions which model the effect of the fault contexts on the network state in (1). More importantly however, it gives us more control over our proofs. For instance, it allows us to express how many unreliable locations may still fail, without committing ourselves to stating precisely which of these locations will fail, as is the case with fault contexts in (1) . In addition, when we reach an extended configuration where n = 0 in (2) above, we can treat unreliable locations as immortal (reliable) since the extended configuration failure bound prohibits further unreliable locations from failing. All this turns out to alleviate some of the burden of constructing our proofs for fault tolerance.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 formally defines the language we use, DπLoc, together with a reduction semantics. It also contains the type system for enforcing the separation between public and confined locations. With this reduction semantics we can adapt the standard notion of reduction barbed congruence, [11, 8] , to DπLoc. But because of our type system, we are assured that the resulting behavioural equivalence reflects the fact that observations can only be made at public locations. In Section 3 we give our formal definitions of faulttolerance, which relies on considering public locations as reliable and confined locations as unreliable. More specifically, we give two versions of (1) above, called 
static and dynamic fault tolerance, motivating the difference between the two via examples. Proof techniques for establishing fault tolerance are given in Section 4 where we give a complete co-inductive characterisation of using labelled actions. In Section 5 we refine these proof techniques for the more demanding fault tolerant definition, dynamic fault tolerance, using co-inductive definitions over extended configurations. We also develop useful up-to techniques for presenting witness bisimulations for extended configurations. Section 6 concludes by outlining the main contributions of the paper and discussing future and related work.
The Language
We assume a set of variables V, ranged over by x, y, z, . . . and a separate set of names, N, ranged over by n, m, . . . , which is divided into locations, L, ranged over by l, k, . . . and channels, C, ranged over by a, b, c, . . .. Finally we use u, v, . . . to range over the set of identifiers, consisting of either variables and names.
The syntax of our language, DπLoc, is a variation of Dπ [10] and is given in Table 1. The main syntactic category is that of systems, ranged over by M, N: these are essentially a collection of located processes, or agents, composed in parallel where location and channel names may be scoped to a subset of agents. The syntax for processes, P, Q, is an extension of that in Dπ. There is input and output on channels; in the latter V represents a tuple of identifiers, while in the former X is tuple of variables, to be interpreted as a pattern. There are also the standard constructs for parallel composition, replicated input, local declarations, a test for equality between identifiers, migration and a zero process. The only addition to the original Dπ is ping k.P else Q, which tests for the liveness status of k in the style of [1, 15] and branches to P if k is alive and Q otherwise. For these terms we assume the standard notions of free and bound occurrences of both names and variables, together with the associated concepts of α-conversion and substitution. We also assume that systems are closed, that is they have no free variable occurrences. Note that all of the examples discussed in Section 1 are valid system level terms in DπLoc. But it is worth emphasising that when we write definitions of the form sys ⇐ S the identifier sys is not part of our language; such definitions merely introduce convenient abbreviations for system level terms; in the above sys is simply an abbreviation for the term S .
Types:
The original Dπ [10] comes endowed with a rich type system used to enforce access control policies. This is ignored in the current paper as it addresses issues which are orthogonal to our concerns. Instead, as explained in the Introduction, we use a simple type system for enforcing visibility constraints on values. The two main type categories, channels and locations, are decorated by visibility annotations, giving ch V Ũ and loc V , where V may either be p, public, or c, confined. In Table 1 these are called stateless types, and are ranged over by U.
The essential constraint enforced by the typing system is that public channels, that is channels whose visibility is p, can only be used to transmit purely public values; we use P to range over the types of these values. The type system also enforces a secondary constraint, namely that all confined locations are free and their number is fixed throughout execution. Stated otherwise, it prohibits scoped confined locations and the creation of fresh confined locations. The reason for the primary constraint is to prohibit observers, which are restricted to public channels/locations, from gaining access to confined channel/location names through interaction. The reason for the secondary restriction is that our definitions of fault tolerance depend on complete knowledge of the unreliable (confined) locations at the beginning of the analysis; we revisit this point later in Section 3.
However there is a complication. As explained in [4] , the reduction semantics is considerably simplified if we also allow types to record the liveness status of a location, whether it is alive or dead. Thus we introduce two further annotations, a and d, which can be added to the locations types, giving the forms loc a V and loc d V . This gives a new class of types, the stateful types, ranged over by T, R. It should be emphasised however that although these stateful types are used in the typing system, typeability does not depend in any way on these liveness status annotations used on the location types.
A type environment Γ is a partial function from names to stateful types whose domain is finite. However when type-checking we wish to ignore the liveness status annotation on types. Consequently we define judgements of the form
where U is a stateless type. The returned type U is obtained simply by dropping the any liveness status annotation in Γ(n). Our typing judgements take the form Γ ⊢ N and are defined by the rules in Table 2 , which use an extended form of type environment, Σ; these, in addition to names, also map variables to stateless types. The rules are standard value passing ones designed to ensure that the values transmitted respect the declared object type of the channels on which they are communicated. The rule (t-out) uses the obvious generalisation of the judgement (3) to values V, while in (t-rest) the standard notation Γ, n : T is used to denote the new environment obtained by extending the function Γ so that it now maps n to the type T. But inherent in the use of this notation is that n is new to dom(Γ). Similar notation is used in (t-nw). The only non-standard feature in the typing rules of Table 2 is the 
condition T loc c in (t-nw) and (t-rest). This additional condition precludes the creation of new confined locations and the existence of scoped confined locations, thereby guaranteeing the secondary restriction of the type system discussed earlier, namely that all confined locations are free.
Example 3 (Type-checking Systems) Let Γ e denote the environment The main property required of our type system is that, in some sense, typing is pre- Reductions then take the form of a binary relation over configurations
defined in terms of the reduction rules in Table 3 , whereby systems reduce with respect to the liveness status of the locations in Γ; here we should emphasise that the reductions depend in no way on the type information in Γ, other than the liveness annotations on location types. 
(X).(P| * a?(X).P)]]
(r-fork)
(r-eq)
(r-neq)
(r-str)
In these rules, in order to emphasise the meaning and abstract away from visibility type information, we write Γ ⊢ l : alive instead of Γ ⊢ l : loc a V ; we also write Γ l : alive instead of Γ ⊢ l : loc d V . Thus all reduction rules assume the location where the code is executing is alive. Moreover, (r-go), (r-ngo), (r-ping) and (r-nping) reduce according to the status of the remote Table 4 . Structural Rules for DπLoc 
location concerned. All the remaining rules are standard, including the use of a structural equivalence ≡ between systems; see [4] for more details. The attentive reader should have noted that when using the rules in Table 3 , whenever Γ ⊲ N −→ Γ ′ ⊲ N ′ it can be deduced that Γ ′ always coincides with Γ. Even though this is certainly true, in later sections we will introduce reductions that change network status of the reduct
PROOF. By induction on the derivation of
As usual the main difficulty occurs with the communication rules, (r-comm) and (r-rep), where the Substitution lemma, Lemma 4 is used. Treatment of (r-str) also requires us to prove that typeability is preserved by the structural equivalence.
We can also show that the type system does indeed fulfill its intended purpose. More specifically, in well-typed systems
• confined values will never be made public.
• confined locations are never scoped.
In Table 5 we formalise these notions of runtime errors, writing
to mean that, intuitively, N is either about to export some confined value on a public channel, (e-out), or currently holds a scoped confined location, (e-scope) -the remaining two rules in Table 5 are standard contextual rules. We show that such errors can never occur in a valid environment.
Proposition 7 (Type Safety)
It is also straightforward to show, using the rules in Figure 5 , that Γ⊲ M −→ err implies Γ M, from which the result follows.
In the remainder of the paper we will confine our attention to valid configurations; from the two previous propositions we know that they are preserved under reductions and they do not give rise to runtime errors.
Behavioural equivalence:
As the appropriate semantic equivalence for DπLoc, we propose a contextual equivalence based on the standard notion of reduction barbed congruence, [11, 8] , which is adapted to the presence of configurations. More importantly, as explained in the Introduction, we refine it further so as to ensure that observations can only be made at public locations. This restriction is enforced using our type system. For any Γ let pub(Γ) be the environment obtained by restricting to names which are assigned public types. Then we write Γ ⊢ obs O, meaning intuitively that O is a valid observer with respect to Γ, whenever pub(Γ) ⊢ O. 
then one reduction step involving the communication of k 1 on channel a yields
Here the valid observer observerGood reduces to the invalid observer observerBad, which has obtained knowledge of the confined location k 1 .
Our type system ensures that this never happens because, although we have
Γ e ⊢ obs observerGood
our type system rejects serverBad (Example 3).
It is convenient to define our behavioural equivalence so that it can relate arbitrary configurations, which now are assumed to be valid; however, we would expect equivalent configurations to have the same public interface. We also only expect it to be preserved by composition with valid observers. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 9 (o-Contextual) A relation over R configurations is called o-Contextual if, whenever Γ⊲
Parallel Observers:
Fresh extensions: Γ, n :: P⊲ M R Γ ′ , n :: P⊲N. Recall that this implies n is fresh to both Γ and Γ ′ .
Since we want to limit observation to public resources, we restrict the standard notion of a barb and limit it to public channels at public, live locations.
denotes an o-observable barb by configuration Γ ⊲ N, on channel a at location l. This is true when
where Γ ⊢ l : loc a p , a : ch p P . We say a relation over configurations preserves barbs if:
The next definition is standard (see [8] ), but is added for completeness.
Definition 11 (Reduction closure)
A relation over R configurations is reductionclosed whenever
Combining these we obtain our touchstone equivalence for DπLoc:
Definition 12 (Reduction barbed congruence) Let be the largest relation between configurations which is: 
Defining Fault Tolerance
We now give contextual definitions of fault-tolerance in the style of (1), outlined in the Introduction. We use the touchstone behavioural equivalence, Definition 12, to compare failure-free and failure-induced configurations. We also quantify over all possible fault contexts, special contexts that induce faults. The specific form of these fault contexts embody our assumptions about faults, which in turn determine the nature of our fault tolerance definitions.
Our definitions of fault tolerance are based on the clear separation of locations into two disjoint sets: reliable locations and unreliable locations. Reliable locations are assumed to be immortal, whereas unreliable locations may be dead already (permanently in fail-stop fashion [17] ) or may die in future. An important assumption of our fault tolerance definitions is that the separation between reliable and unreliable locations happens once, at the start of the analysis, based on the location information at that moment; intuitively, we pick a subset from the free locations which we assume to be unreliable. Since scoped locations are not known to us at this stage, we cannot tag them as unreliable, which is why the type system in Section 2 precluded scoped unreliable(confined) locations. Once unreliable locations are determined, we take a prescriptive approach and force observers to reside at reliable locations only, thereby ensuring that they never incur failure directly. To put it more succinctly, observations never fail.
Nevertheless, an observer can still be affected by failure indirectly. This happens when an observer interacts with system code residing at public locations whose behaviour depends, in some way or another, on code residing at unreliable locations.
In such a setting, fault tolerance would be a property of the system code at public locations, which preserves its behaviour up to a certain level of fault, even when the unreliable code it depends on (residing at unreliable locations) fails. If we map public locations to reliable locations and confined locations as unreliable, then the framework developed in Section 2 fits our requirements for such a definition; the type system also ensures that this clear separation between reliable and unreliable code is preserved during interaction, by ensuring that an observer will never receive an unreliable location, when it is expecting a reliable one. In the remainder of the document we will interchangeably use the terms reliable and unreliable for public and confined types respectively.
Our first notion of n-fault-tolerance, formalising the intuition behind (1), is when the faulting context induces at most n location failures prior to the execution of the system. Of course, these failures must only be induced on locations which are confined, based on the prior assumption that public locations are reliable, and thus immortal. The implicit assumptions behind our first fault tolerance definition are that:
• either the unreliable locations have always been dead and no more failure will occur in future.
• or the frequency of failure occurrence, which often happens in bursts, is much lower than that of reduction steps, within a give period of time. Thus we can assume that computations will not be interleaved by further failures.
Formally, we define the operation Γ − l as: Our second notion of n-fault tolerance is based on faults that may occur asynchronously at any stage during the execution of a system. This translates to a weaker assumption about the periodicity of faults than that underlying Definition 14. Also, this second fault tolerance definition does not assume any dependency between faults. It only assumes an upper-bound of faults and that faults are permanent.
To formalise this notion we to extend the language DπLoc, by introducing a new process called kill. Then the new system l [[kill] ] simply asynchronously kills location l. The reduction semantics, and typing rule, for this new construct is given in Table 6 . We use DπLoc e to denote the extended language, and note that because of the typing rule only confined locations can be killed. 
Proof Techniques for Fault Tolerance
We define a labelled transition system (lts) for DπLoc e , which consists of a collection of transitions over (closed) configurations,
where µ can be any of the following:
where the namesñ bind a subset of the names in V in both the input and output transitions. Bound names in output labels denote scope extruded names whereas bound names in input labels denote fresh names introduced by the (implicit) observer. These three transitions are defined inductively by the rules given in Table 7 and Table 8 , inspired by [9, 8, 4] , but with a number of differences.
In accordance with Definition 10 (observable barbs) and Definitions 9 (valid observers), (l-in) and (l-out) restrict external communication to public channels at public locations, where the notation Γ ⊢ obs l and Γ ⊢ obs a denote Γ ⊢ l : loc p and Γ ⊢ a : ch p P respectively, for some typesP. Furthermore, in (l-in) we require that the types of the values received, V, match the object type of channel a; since a is public and configurations are well-typed, this also implies that V are public values defined in Γ. More prosaically, the object type of the input channel isP, and by Lemma 4, we know the reduct is still well-typed. The restriction on the rule for output transitions, together with the assumption that all configurations are well-typed, also means that in (l-open) we only scope extrude public values. Contrary to [4] , the lts does not allow external killing of locations (through the label kill : l) since public locations are reliable and never fail. Finally, the transition rule for internal communication, (l-par-comm), uses an overloaded function ↑ (−) for inferring input/output capabilities of the sub-systems: when applied to types, ↑ (T) transforms all the type tags to public (p); when applied to environments, ↑ (Γ) changes all the 
[[a?(X).P]] l:a?(V)
− −−−− → Γ ⊲ l[[P{ V /X}]] Γ ⊢ obs l, Γ ⊢ a : ch p P , V :P (l-in-rep) Γ ⊲ l[[ * a?(X).P]] τ −→ Γ ⊲ l
[[a?(X).(P| * a?(X).P)]]
(l-out)
Γ k : alive types to public types in the same manner. The definitions for these operations are 
All the remaining rules are simplified versions of the corresponding rules in [4] .
Using the lts of actions we can now define, in the standard manner, weak bisimulation equivalence over configurations. Our definition uses the standard notation for weak actions; we use =⇒ as a shorthand for the reflexive transitive closure on silent 
Definition 18 (Weak bisimulation equivalence) A relation R over configurations is called a bisimulation if whenever
Γ M ⊲ M R Γ N ⊲ N, then • Γ M ⊲ M µ −→ Γ ′ M ⊲ M ′ implies Γ N ⊲ Nˆµ =⇒ Γ ′ N ⊲ N ′ such that Γ ′ M ⊲ M ′ R Γ ′ N ⊲ N ′ • Γ N ⊲ N µ −→ Γ ′ N ⊲ N ′ implies Γ M ⊲ Mμ =⇒ Γ ′ M ⊲ M ′ such that Γ ′ M ⊲ M ′ R Γ ′ N ⊲ N ′
Weak bisimulation equivalence, denoted by ≈, is taken to be the largest bisimulation.

Theorem 19 (Full Abstraction) Suppose pub(Γ) = pub(Γ ′ ). Then for any DπLoc e configurations Γ⊲ M, Γ
′ ⊲N:
we show that ≈ satisfies all the defining properties of (Definition 12). The most involved task is showing that ≈ is o-Contextual (Definition 9). This has already been done in [4] for more complex contexts. Following the approach there, we inductively define a relation R as the least relation over configurations satisfying:
In R we add an extra clause from those given in Definition 9, namely the last one for name scoping. We then show that R is a bisimulation; since ≈ is the largest possible bisimulation it follows that R ⊆ ≈. Because of the definition of R it then follows that ≈, when confined to configurations with the same public interface, is o-Contextual.
The proof for the converse,
relies on the notion of definability, that is, for every action, relative to a type environment Γ, there is an observer which uses the public knowledge of Γ to completely characterise the effect of that action. In our case, we only need to prove definability for input/output actions, which has already been done for a more complex setting in [4] 
Here we give the witness relation for the most involved case, for k 1 , and leave the other simpler cases for the interested reader. The witness relation is R defined as
where d stands for data and
R is the union of all the relations R ′ (n, m) where n, m denote the possible names for the value and return channel that are received on channel serv. 
Generic Techniques for Dynamic Fault Tolerance
In spite of the benefits gained from proof techniques developed in Section 4, proving positive fault tolerance results still entails a lot of unnecessary repeated work. This problem is mainly due to Definition 14 and Definition 16, which quantify over all fault contexts. The universal quantification of fault contexts can generally be bounded, as in Example 20, through the n index of the fault contexts (indicating the maximum failure to induce) and by the number of unreliable locations defined in the environment, which limits the witness bisimulations we need to construct. Despite such bounds on fault contexts, we are still required to perform much redundant work. For instance, to prove that server 3 is 2-fault tolerant, we need to provide 6 bisimulation relations 2 , one for every different case in
A closer inspection of the required relations reveals that there is a lot of overlap between them. For instance, in the witness bisimulation where i = 1, j = 2 and in the witness bisimulation for i = 1, j = 3, in each case part of our analysis requires us to consider the behavior of server 3 under a setting where k 1 dies first, leading to a large number of bisimilar tuples which are common to both witness bisimulations. These overlapping states would be automatically circumvented if we require a single relation that is somewhat the merging of all of these separate relations.
Hence, in this section we reformulate our fault tolerance definition for dynamic fault tolerance (the most demanding) to reflect such a merging of relations; a similar Table 9 . Fail Silent Transition Rule DπLoc
definition for the static case should be amenable to similar treatment. We start by defining extended configurations, which have the form
where M is a system from DπLoc and Γ ⊲ M is a (valid) configuration. Intuitively, the extended configuration above denotes a system M, without any sub-systems of the form l [[kill] ], that is running on the network Γ, where at most n unreliable locations may fail. The additional network information in the form of a fault bound gives us an upper limit on the unreliable locations that may still fail. It provides a more succinct way of expressing dynamic failure, without recurring to the fault inducing code of the form l [[kill] ]. More specifically, it allows us to express how many unreliable locations may still fail, in line with Definition 16, without committing ourselves as to which of these locations will fail, as is the case when using fault contexts. This leads to an alternative definition for dynamic fault tolerance that is easier to work with.
The network fault upper bound gives us further advantages. For instance it gives us more control when, after a possibly empty sequence of transitions, we reach configurations with n = 0; it less obvious to discern this from systems containing asynchronous kills l [[kill] ]. In these extreme cases, we can treat code at unreliable locations as reliable, since the network failure upper-bound guarantees that none of these will fail, thereby simplifying our analysis.
We define transitions between tuples of extended configurations as
in terms of all the transition rules given in Tables 7 and 8 , with the exception of (l-kill), which is replaced by the new transition (l-fail) defined in Table 9 , describing dynamic failure. Even though the transitions in Table 7 and Table 8 are defined on configurations, they can be applied to extended configurations in the obvious way. For example, the previous transition (l-out) applied to extended configurations now reads
We note that, for all transitions adapted from Tables 7 and 8 , the network upperbound does not change from the source to the target configuration.
Our previous configurations Γ ⊲ M can be viewed as a simple instance of extended configurations of the form Γ, 0 ⊲ M where the maximum number dynamic failures that may occur at unreliable locations is 0. Also, using transitions defined over extended configurations (5), we smoothly carry over the previous definition of bisimulation, Definition 18, to extended configurations. We next give an alternative (co-inductive) definition of dynamic n-fault tolerance, based on extended configurations.
Definition 21 (Co-inductive Dynamic Fault Tolerance) A configuration Γ ⊲ N is co-inductive n (-dynamic) fault tolerant if
Before we can use Definition 21 to prove dynamic fault tolerance, we need to show that the new definition is sound with respect to our previous definition of dynamic fault tolerance, Definition 16. This proof requires a lemma stating the correspondence between actions in configurations and actions in extended configurations.
Lemma 22 (Actions for Configurations and Extended Configurations)
Suppose M is a DπLoc system. Then for every n ≥ 0,
PROOF. The first statement is proved by induction the derivations of
The second is a simple analysis of the transitions involved. Note that here, because Γ ⊲ M|l [[kill] ] is assumed to be a configuration, we are assured that Γ ⊢ l : loc a c . See (t-kill) in Table 6 .
Theorem 23 (Soundness of Co-inductive Dynamic Fault Tolerance)
PROOF. Let R n be a relation parameterised by a number n and defined as
We proceed by showing that R n is a bisimulation over DπLoc configurations, up to structural equivalence; that is R n ⊆ ≈ (6) The required soundness result then follows because if
then by (6) and the definition of R n we know that for every dynamic n-fault context F˜l D (−), we also have
which by Definition 16 means that Γ ⊲ M is dynamic n-fault tolerant.
In the proof of (6), we focus on matching the actions of the right hand side configuration in R n ; we leave the simpler case, that is matching the actions of the left hand side, to the interested reader. We thus assume
for some 0 ≤ m ≤ n and we have
We have to show that 
(a) In this case, from (7) and the definition of R n we know
Also, by (a) and Lemma 22(1) we also have
From (9) we know that (10) can be matched by
From (11) and Lemma 22(1) we deduce
and from (12) and the definition of R n we also know
(b) In this case, once again from (7) and the definition of R n we know
Using (8) and Lemma 22(2) we can derive
From (13) we know (14) can be matched by
From (15) and Lemma 22(1) we obtain
and from (16) we get the required pairing
With Theorem 23, we can now give a single witness bisimulation to show the dynamic fault tolerance of a configuration. However, a considerable number of transitions in these witness bisimulations turn out to be confluent silent transitions, meaning that they do not affect the set of transitions we can undertake in our bisimulations, now or in the future. One consequence of this fact is that reduction via such confluent moves produces bisimilar configurations. We thus develop up-to bisimulation techniques that abstract over such moves. This alleviates the burden of exhibiting our witness bisimulations and allows us to focus on the transitions that really matter. 
, we denote β-actions or β-moves as
These β-transitions are defined in Table 10 and Table 11 . Our situation is more complicated than that in [3] because we also have to deal with failure. While we directly inherit local rules, such as (b-eq) and (b-fork), and context rules, such as (b-rest) and (b-par), we do not carry over distributed silent transitions such as code migration across locations. Instead, we here identify three sub-cases when migration is a β-move, that is
• when we are migrating to a location that is dead, (b-ngo). 
• when we are migrating from a public location (thus immortal) to another live location (b-go-pub).
• when both the source and destination locations are alive and we cannot induce further dynamic failures, (b-go-ff).
Migration across locations is generally not a confluent move because it can be interfered with by failure. More specifically, the source location may fail before the code migrates, killing the code that could otherwise exhibit observable behaviour at the destination location. However, migrations to a dead location k, (b-ngo), are confluent because they all reduce to the system k [[0] ] which has no further transitions.
Migrations from an immortal location, (b-go-pub), are confluent because failure can only affect the destination location; if the code migrates before the destination location fails then it crashes at the destination; if it migrates after the destination fails 
then the case is similar to that of (b-ngo). 3 Finally, if we cannot induce more failures, as is the case of (b-go-ff), then trivially we cannot interfere with migration between two live locations.
Similarly, pinging is generally not confluent because the location tested for may change its status and affect the branching of the ping's transition. However there are specific cases where it is a β-move, namely
• when the location tested is alive and no more failures can occur, (b-ping-ff).
• when the location tested is dead, (b-nping).
• when the location tested is public, and therefore immortal, (b-ping-pub).
In all three cases, the location tested for cannot change its status before or after the ping.
Even though a setting with failure requires us to analyse many more states than in a failure-free setting and limits the use of β-moves, we can exploit the permanent nature of the failure assumed in our model to define a stronger structural equivalence than the one defined earlier in Table 4 . The new structural equivalence, denoted as ≡ f , is strengthened by defining it over extended configurations instead of over systems. It is the least relation satisfying the rules in Table 12 and closed under the obvious generalisation of the operations of parallel composition and name restriction to extended configurations. Taking advantage of the network status, we can add a new structural rule, (bs-dead), which allows us to equate dead code, that is code residing at (permanently) dead locations. 
As with the standard structural equivalence, one can show that ≡ f is a strong bisimulation:
Lemma 25 (≡ f is a strong bisimulation)
Lemma 26 (Commutativity of ≡ f and
Now, mimicking the proof strategy of the previous lemma, we can use induction on the proof of (17) to find a matching transition
Lemma 27 (Confluence of β-moves) τ −→ β observes the following diamond property:
where R is the relation
The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of N and then by case analysis of the different types of µ and induction on the derivation of the β-move.
As examples, we consider two of the more interesting cases. First we consider the case where the relation R required to complete the confluence diamond is a case of ≡ f . The second case is an instance where R is
(1) Consider the case where
By case analysis and (19), we know that the β-move is the local reduction (b-eq) and thus
From (20) we know the last rule used to derive the other action is (l-fail) and thus, using (19), we also derive
We focus on the case where k ′ = l and leave the case when k ′ l to the interested reader. On one side, using (21) we can produce
But on the other side we cannot produce a matching β-move because l, the location the name matching β-move is performed, is dead in Γ − l. However, the two reducts differ only with respect to dead code and we can use R =≡ f and (bs-dead) to get
(2) Consider a second case where
(22) µ = τ and n ′ = n − 1 ( a confined location was dynamically killed) (23) and moreover
Using (22), (24), (25) and case analysis we know that the β-move was derived using (b-go-pub), and thus we obtain
From (23) we know the last rule used to derive the other action is (l-fail) and thus, using (22), we also obtain
We focus on the case where k ′ = k and leave the case when k ′ k to the interested reader. On one side, using (26) we can produce
But on the other side we cannot produce a matching β-move using the same β-rule (b-go-pub) because k, the destination of the migration, is dead in Γ − k. Instead, we can use an alternative β-move, this time using (b-ngo) to obtain
and use the case when R = ( τ −→ β • ≡ f ) to relate the two reducts, which differ only with respect to dead code. More precisely, we use (bs-dead) once again to get • l, the destination location is alive, Γ ⊢ l : alive.
Here, contrary to [3] , the silent migration transition,
can not be a β-move, even if we abstract over dead code. The problem occurs when we consider the transition killing k, and obtaining
Here we can never complete the diamond diagram for these two transitions, as required in Lemma 27.
Lemma 29 (Confluence over Weak moves)
where the length of the derivation of
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the length of derivation, using Lemma 27, Corollary 26 and Lemma 25.
PROOF. We define R as
Using Lemma 27 and Lemma 25 it is easy to show that R a bisimulation. Then by transitivity of ≈ we obtain the required result.
Definition 31 (Bisimulation up-to β-moves) A relation R over configurations is called a bisimulation up-to β-moves, if whenever
We use ≈ β to denote the largest such relation.
Definition 31 provides us with a powerful method for approximating bisimulations. In a bisimulation up-to-β-moves an action
′ ⊲ N ′ modulo structural equivalence on the one side, and up-to bisimilarity on the other side, the pairs Γ
′ are once more related. Intuitively then, in such a relation a configuration can represent all the configurations to which it can evolve using β-moves. in order to justify the use of these approximate bisimulations we need the following result:
PROOF.
We proceed by induction on the length of
The base case, when the length is zero and
There are two inductive cases. Here we focus on one case where (27) and leave the other (similar) case for the interested reader.
By the definition of ≈ β , Definition 31, there exists Γ
By (27) and the expansion of (28) we have the following diagram to complete, for some Γ
We immediately fill the first part of the diagram, using Lemma 29 and Lemma 25, to get the following:
By our inductive hypothesis we fill in the third part where
And finally we complete the diagram by the definition of ≈
The required result follows from the above completed diagram and the fact that 
Proposition 33 (Soundness of bisimulations up-to-β-moves)
Γ, n ⊲ N ≈ β Γ ′ , m ⊲ M implies Γ, n ⊲ N ≈ Γ ′ , m ⊲ M
PROOF.
We prove the proposition by defining the relation R as
and showing that it is a bisimulation. The result then follows, since ≈⊆ R.
From (29) and the definition of bisimulation we know
By Lemma 32, (32), and (30) we know
and by (33) and (31) we also conclude
(34) which is our matching move, where
2 by (32), (33), (34) and the transitivity of ≈.
As a result of Theorem 23, in order to prove that server 2 is dynamically 1-fault tolerant, we can use Definition 21 and give a single witness bisimulation relation satisfying Γ e , 0 ⊲ server 2 ≈ Γ e , 1 ⊲ server 2 , as opposed to three separate relations otherwise required by Definition 16. But now, because of Proposition 33 we can go one step further and limit ourselves to a single witness bisimulation up-to β-moves. This approach is taken in the following, final, example. We note however that for cases when the potential dynamic failure is also 0 in the right configuration ( concepts such as redundancy (called "duplication") and failure-free execution are identified, the setting and development of Prasad differs considerably form ours. In essence, three new operators ("displace", "audit" and "checkpoint") are introduced in a variant of CCS; equational laws for terms using these operators are then developed so that algebraic manipulation can be used to show that terms in this calculus are, in some sense, fault tolerant with respect to their specification.
Example 34 (Proving Dynamic Fault Tolerance) Consider the relation R over extended configurations, defined by
The use of confluence of certain τ-steps as a useful technique for the management of large bisimulations is not new. It has been already studied extensively in [13, 7] . See [6] for particularly good examples of where they have significantly decreased the size of witness bisimulations. Elsewhere, Nestmann et al. [12] have explored various other ways of using bounds in the environment to govern permissible failures.
